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Abstract 
This paper examines the market reactions to 817 investor presentations by 326 
Australian resource firms and finds evidence suggesting these events are informative. 
Furthermore, the positive returns do not reverse over the following 15 days, which contrasts 
with previous investor presentation research. However, consistent with the prior literature, 
extended long run cumulative abnormal returns are not significantly different from zero. This 
paper also documents stronger reactions to first time presenting firms, presentations that are 
announced to the market and firms exhibiting at the Africa Downunder and Excellence in Oil 
& Gas conferences. There are also stronger reactions for firms with lower ownership 
concentration. Examining boutique resource firm investor presentations adds to the existing 
disclosure and dissemination literature due to the presence of relatively high information 
asymmetry in the extractive industries, a unique setting which contrasts with previous studies.  
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1 Introduction 
This study examines the abnormal market reaction to Australian boutique resource 
investor presentations to document whether they are significant events in terms of 
shareholder wealth effects. We provide evidence on whether presentations aid in capital 
allocation and are an effective use of investor and CEO time or are simply uninformative. We 
also investigate a range of resource presentation outlets, presentation initiation and firm level 
attributes to provide insight into which presentations are more highly valued, if any 
presentation outlet is better at picking future winners over the longer term and which firm 
specific characteristics influence the extent of the market reaction. 
Although there has been a large range of literature on disclosure (for instance see 
Healy and Palepu, 2001) and dissemination (Ferguson and Crockett, 2003; Tetlock et al., 
2008; Fang and Peress, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010; Soltes, 2010), firm presentations are an 
interesting and unique phenomenon to study as they occur in a physical location, with an 
opportunity for face-to-face interaction and questioning. Furthermore, presentations in the 
resource sector setting are generally not earnings focused and are often scheduled in advance 
with both the audience and presenter specifically attracted to the event. Therefore, the 
purpose of a presentation is often to build a broader understanding of firm operations and 
increase market participants’ firm specific awareness. However, as presenters must be invited 
and accept, there is potential for self-selection bias in the study of presentations as they are 
likely dominated by good news growth firms (Francis et al., 1997). Existing literature finds 
increases in analyst following and a positive market reaction to investor presentations, 
including stronger reactions to more important presentation outlets (Francis et al., 1997; 
Bushee et al., 2009). However, the positive reaction found to presentations to the New York 
Society of Security Analysts quickly reverses (Francis et al., 1997).   
This paper adds to the literature by focusing on boutique conference presentations by 
Australian resource firms. Broadly, on the supply side, resource firms have incentives to 
publicize good news due to the inherently high information asymmetry environment. On the 
demand side, investors have incentives to attend and participate in resource industry investor 
presentations due to the potentially large payoffs. Resource disclosure is argued to contain 
difficult to interpret non-financial information, such as metal purity, drilling intercepts and 
geochemical composition (Ferguson and Crockett, 2003) which have greater relevance to 
resource firms than financial information (Ferguson et al., 2011a). This suggests a greater 
importance in attending presentations as these issues are discussed in detail. The Australian 
institutional setting is different from the U.S. and its less litigious nature suggests greater 
incentives to signal good news during investor presentations in a relatively costless manner. 
In addition, Australian continuous disclosure standards mean that if presentations contain 
significant new information they must be disclosed to the market as well, potentially creating 
a dual effect of both the resource presentation and wider market reactions to the presentation 
materials. There may also be a different type of investor attracted to smaller resource firms. 
Anecdotally for example, there may be the presence of ‘gold bugs’ or passionate gold 
investors and others motivated by the higher risk-return trade-off. 
We investigate resource firm investor presentations at mining clubs and conferences 
by examining the abnormal market reaction to 817 presentations by 326 firms between 2000 
and 2009. Specifically, we examine the reaction to presentations at the Diggers and Dealers, 
Association of Mining and Exploration Companies, Africa Downunder and both the 
Excellence in Mining and Exploration and Excellence in Oil and Gas conferences and the 
Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane mining clubs. This paper documents significantly positive 
cumulative abnormal return (CAR) and abnormal turnover around presentations, indicative of 
presentations being significant market events. The significantly positive CAR in the 15 days 
leading up to the presentation suggests that there is either good news released before 
presentations or market anticipation of the presentation. In contrast with previous investor 
presentation research, there is no negative average returns or mean reversion over the 
following 15 days. However, the extended long run CAR is not significantly different from 
zero, suggesting that presentations have no consistent long term benefits or ability to select 
future winners. In a restricted sample, there are stronger reactions to first time presentations, 
presentations announced to the market and presentations at Africa Downunder and 
Excellence in Oil & Gas, but only over the 31 day window. We also document a negative 
coefficient on ownership concentration, suggesting that presentations are of greater use to 
firms with more disperse ownership. Overall, the results show that resource firm investor 
presentations are significant events, but there is no consistent extended benefit. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews related literature on 
investor presentations and develops the hypotheses. Section 3 outlines sample selection and 
the research model with results discussed in Section 4. The conclusions are presented in 
Section 5. 
 
 
2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Recent research has studied publicizing or increasing awareness of firm news in an 
attempt to counteract the tendency to invest in the familiar (Huberman, 2001). Results show 
positive market reactions to behaviour that can raise awareness, such as the hiring of investor 
relation firms (Bushee and Miller, 2007; Solomon, 2009), being the focus of popular 
investment columns (Brown et al., 2009) and television interviews or recommendations 
(Busse and Green, 2002; Meschke and Kim, 2010). Press coverage also has a significant 
effect on price and information asymmetry (Ferguson and Crockett, 2003; Tetlock et al., 
2008; Fang and Peress, 2009; Bushee et al., 2010; Soltes, 2010; Li et al., 2011). In addition, 
conference call communications between management and analysts are found to be 
significant market events (Tasker, 1998; Frankel et al., 1999), conference calls open to 
anyone produce different reactions to calls limited to invited participants (Bushee et al., 
2003) and conference calls where all questions are not answered produce more negative 
returns (Hollander et al., 2010).  
However, there is mixed evidence of whether the effect of firms publicizing their 
news is long lasting. The spin hypothesis proposes that when firms try to increase the 
dissemination of news, they are hyping good news which will lead to a temporary increase in 
price by non-information traders until the release of additional evidence that allows correct 
inferences to be drawn (Campbell et al., 1993). In contrast, the visibility hypothesis argues 
that a permanent increase in price will follow due to greater firm awareness, leading to higher 
analyst coverage, more diverse and geographically distant investors and improved liquidity 
(Merton, 1987). A long lasting effect could also be caused by a selection bias, in that good 
news firms are more likely to increase dissemination. 
Investor presentations are very different to other dissemination mechanisms for a 
variety of reasons, including a physical location, face-to-face interaction with the potential for 
aggressive questioning, a non-earnings focus (especially in the case of resource firms), pre-
advanced scheduling and the selection of the presenting firm. Existing presentation research 
finds that presenters to the New York Society of Security Analysts, over 1986 to 1992, are 
typically larger and more profitable firms, consistent with their presentations being of interest 
to analysts (Francis et al., 1997). Furthermore, Francis et al. (1997) document a positive 
reaction that quickly reverses over the next 10 days and an increase in analyst following 
although there is no improvement in forecast accuracy. 
In recent years there has been dramatic growth in the number and variety of 
conference presentations, leading to Bushee et al. (2009) investigating 95,105 presentations 
at a wide range of outlets and locations. Bushee et al. (2009) document similar results to 
Francis et al. and stronger market reactions to larger, industry focused presentation outlets in 
money centres or holiday locations. A long lasting increase in analyst coverage and 
institutional shareholders is also documented post-presentation, with conference attributes 
moderating this relationship. For example, product focused conferences have a smaller effect 
on analyst coverage. 
However, would current results be expected to extend to Australian resource firm 
investor presentations? The literature has largely ignored boutique industry presentations and 
any differential effect in relatively high information asymmetry settings, such as the 
Australian resource sector. The high prospective payoffs for mineral discovery and growth in 
resource delineation, coupled with the potentially different characteristics of small-cap 
resource firms presenting, could produce very different reactions from large American 
corporate presentations. Table 1 provides descriptive evidence of this difference by reporting 
the mean and median financial characteristics of all Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) firms 
in 2009 with Aspect Huntley data coverage by 2-digit Global Industry Classification Standard 
(GICS) groupings. Resource firms can fall into either energy or material categories 
depending on their operational focus and can be seen to be smaller, with less debt financing. 
However, resource firms have higher current ratios, likely reflecting the need to conserve 
cash for exploration and that bank loans are seldom offered to exploration firms. 
Furthermore, the lower profitability suggests that traditional cash flow analysis is less suited 
to many firms in the sector especially smaller mining development stage entities (DSE) who 
do not earn material cash flows. The different characteristics of resource firms to firms in 
other industries is supported by Ferguson et al. (2011b), who document that resource DSE 
have significant differences in firm characteristics, including lower debt, profitability and 
analyst coverage relative to similar sized non-resource firms. Overall, there is strong evidence 
that the resource sector has different firm characteristics leading to potentially higher 
information asymmetry and lower information intermediation. 
A typical resource investor presentation does not have an earnings focus. Instead 
managers typically discuss the prospectivity of their tenements portfolios, key project 
progression and milestone accomplishment along the mine development life cycle. Ferguson 
et al. (2011a) documents that non-financial information is more relevant in predicting project 
failure for gold-developers, suggesting that the non-financial information disclosed in 
presentations is likely to be of greater relevance to resource sector investors. In addition, 
Australian continuous disclosure standards mean that if a presentation contains significant 
new information it must be disclosed to the market as well, potentially creating a dual effect 
that both the resource presentation attendees and wider market reacts to the presentation. An 
alternative view is that these resource presentations are routine events and contain non-
informative ‘spin’ prompting no market reaction, particularly if the presentation only stresses 
known deposit characteristics and the presenter avoids answering audience questions. This 
leads to the first null hypothesis: 
 
H1: There is no market reaction to resource firm investor presentations. 
 
In addition, different presentation characteristics may affect the market reaction to the 
presentation. Specifically, different presentation outlets may prompt diverse market reactions 
based on the format and prestige of the event. The first presentation offered by a company 
may also prompt a stronger reaction as it could suggest an initiation of a broader 
dissemination policy or contain more price relevant information. There may be different 
reactions to firms focused on precious metals or Australian operationally focused firms. 
Therefore, the second null hypothesis is stated as: 
 
H2: There is no association between presentation characteristics and the market 
reaction to resource firm investor presentations. 
 
3 Research model 
3.1 Sample and data collection 
We manually construct the sample of resource firm investor presentations by 
contacting the organizers of resource conferences and mining clubs and asking for the date 
and name of presenting firms. We then manually check the information and remove 
presentations which are not made by ASX listed firms or are generic and non-firm focused in 
nature.1 We collect data from a large range of resource conferences and mining clubs, to 
allow the investigation of whether presentation attributes impact market reaction and to 
                                                          
1 For example, if the presentation was titled “Thoughts on the mining tax” it was removed from the sample. 
ensure the robustness of inferences. However, a potential limitation is that as we capture a 
large range, but not all presentation outlets, presentation initiation could be misclassified or 
insignificant presentations excluded, biasing the results. 
It is also important to recognise the difference between conferences and mining clubs. 
Resource conferences are annual events over several days, with multiple presentations a day 
and occasionally concurrent sessions. In contrast, mining clubs are monthly or bimonthly 
events with a comparatively longer presentation by generally one firm over lunch. 
Specifically, the sample includes Diggers and Dealers (DND), Association of Mining & 
Exploration Companies (AMEC), Excellence in Mining & Exploration (EME), Excellence in 
Oil & Gas (EOG) and Africa Downunder (ADU) conferences and the Sydney (SMC), 
Melbourne (MMC) and Brisbane (BMC) mining club events (cumulatively the mining club 
events are labelled Club).  
To conduct the analysis, we use market data from SIRCA daily data file, firm level 
financial data from Aspect Huntley, word count measures from ISYS and firms without data 
are removed from the sample. This results in a sample of 817 presentations however only 733 
presentation observations have market data to calculate the longer return window of days -15 
to 200. Furthermore, only 766 observations have readable data to calculate the ISYS 
measures of PREC and AUS, therefore the determinants regression is conducted on a sample 
of 766, 766 and 698 observations for the 31, 1 and 216 day windows, respectively.  
 
3.2 Return measurement 
The abnormal return for firm i at event date t is calculated as: 
 
𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = �𝑃𝑖,𝑡−𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1𝑃𝑖,𝑡−1 � − �𝑅𝑠𝑟,𝑡−𝑅𝑠𝑟,𝑡−1𝑅𝑠𝑟,𝑡−1 �        (1) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal return of firm i at time t, 𝑃𝑖,𝑡 is the share price of firm i at 
time t and 𝑅𝑠𝑟,𝑡 is the level of the Standard and Poors (S&P) Small Resources Index at time t. 
Cumulative abnormal returns over the period (p,q) are calculated as: 
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡(𝑝, 𝑞) = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡𝑞𝑡=𝑝          (2) 
 
Abnormal turnover of shares at date t for firm i is calculated as: 
 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 = � 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡#𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡� − � 𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡#𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡�       (3) 
 
Where 𝐴𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is the abnormal turnover of firm i at time t, 𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the volume of 
shares traded for firm i at time t, #𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 is the number of ordinary shares outstanding for 
firm i at time t and 𝐸𝑉𝑂𝐿𝑖,𝑡 is the average volume of shares traded for firm i over days t-90 to 
t-30.2 
 
3.3 Regression model 
We use the following ordinary least squares (OLS) regression to provide evidence 
whether presentation and firm characteristics impact the significance of the resource 
presentation. To control for potential cross-sectional dependent variable correlation, we 
follow Gow et al. (2010) and cluster standard errors by year (also referred to as Humber-
White standard errors) to control for this problem.3 This approach allows for correlation 
within, but not across clusters and thus controls for the correlation of CAR between firms 
presenting at the same conference in the same year. CAR correlation could be caused by 
information transfer or a resource boom year.   
 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐷𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4𝐸𝑂𝐺𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐴𝐷𝑈𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽6𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽7𝐴𝑁𝑁 + 𝛽8𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽9𝐴𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽10𝑃𝑆𝐷𝐼𝑆𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽11𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽12𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽13𝑇𝑂𝑃20𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜀           (4) 
 
Where 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑖,𝑡 is the cumulative abnormal return of firm i at time t calculated per 
equations 1 and 2; 𝐷𝑁𝐷𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 for a Diggers and Dealers 
conference presentation and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝑀𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 for a 
Association of Mining & Exploration Companies conference presentation and 0 otherwise;  
𝐸𝑀𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 for an Excellence in Mining & Exploration conference 
presentation and 0 otherwise; 𝐸𝑂𝐺𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 for a Excellence in Oil & 
Gas conference presentation and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝐷𝑈𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable equal to 1 for an 
                                                          
2 7 observations did not have volume data over this period and the period t+30 to t+90 is substituted to calculate 
EVOL. Results are robust to the inclusion and exclusion of these observations.  
3 Alternate standard error specifications produce similar results.  
Africa Downunder conference presentation and 0 otherwise; 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑖,𝑡 is a binary variable equal 
to 1 if the presentation at time t is the first presentation of firm i and 0 otherwise; 𝐴𝑁𝑁𝑖,𝑡 is a 
binary variable equal to 1 if the presentation at time t by firm i is announced to the market 
and 0 otherwise.4 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 and 𝐴𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 proxy for firm focus on precious metals and Australian operations 
respectively. We follow Ferguson and Walker (2011) by using ISYS software to count 
specific word mentions in text documents when constructing these variables. Specifically, 
𝑃𝑅𝐸𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the count of the words ‘gold’, ‘silver’, ‘palladium’, ‘platinum’ and ‘precious’ over 
mentions of all minerals in the annual report of firm i in year t. 𝐴𝑈𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is the count of the 
word ‘Australia’ over mentions of all countries in the annual report of firm i in year t. 
Variable construction naturally limits these variables to a range between 0 and 1. PSDISC is 
the number of price-sensitive announcements issued by firm i over the 15 days before and 
after event date t, controlling for any other firm specific information released to the market. 
𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖,𝑡 is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of firm i as at the end of 
year t; 𝑀𝑂𝑀𝑖,𝑡 proxies for resource sentiment as measured by the difference in S&P Goldman 
Sachs Commodity Index (GSCI) spot price from the start of the presenting month to one year 
previously; 𝑇𝑂𝑃20𝑖,𝑡 is the percentage of shares owned by the largest 20 shareholders as 
reported in the annual report of firm i in year t and 𝜀𝑖 is the normally distributed error term. 
 
4 Results 
4.1 Descriptive statistics 
Table 2 presents counts for each conference and club presentation outlet and 
presentation characteristics over time, with the final sample comprising of 817 presentations 
by 326 firms. The sample is skewed towards the later part of the decade, with two 
conferences, EME and EOG starting in 2008. There are considerably more conference 
presentations than mining club presentations, consistent with resource conferences having 
many presenting firms in one day. Presentation initiation is stable until a large jump during 
the resource boom year of 2008, with a corresponding increase in presentation outlets. Firms 
increasingly announce investor presentations to the market over the time period examined, 
consistent with a greater emphasis on disseminating firm news. 
                                                          
4 We include in this measure market announcements that direct investors to the presentation (for example, on the 
firm website) and presentation announcements from other outlets over the 15 days before and after event date t, 
due to the likely identical nature of the presentations. 
Descriptive statistics for presenting firms are contained in Table 3. There is a large 
range in the descriptive statistics, including substantial differences between means and 
medians, likely due to the sample including both large firms and a significant number of 
DSE’s. Indicative of the sample containing equity funded explorers, we note that several 
firms have few liabilities. There is also a large range in market capitalization, with the 
smallest firm being worth less than $1 million, although the median is $129 million. The 
mean percentage of shares owned by the top 20 shareholders is 61.38% (median 61.31%). 
PREC and AUS have similar descriptive statistics with means of 0.420 and 0.431, 
respectively. Both ISYS variables have the lowest and highest possible minimum and 
maximum of 0 and 1, respectively. On average firms release 4.83 (median 4.00) price-
sensitive disclosures in the 31 day window around the investor presentation (i.e., -15 to 15). 
Table 4 illustrates differences between firm characteristics for presenting firms split 
by club (Club) and conference (Conference) presentations, although many firms present at 
both conferences and clubs. These results indicate that firms presenting at mining clubs are 
significantly bigger and less focused on Australian operations than firms presenting at 
conferences. This is likely due to conferences giving a large number of local explorers’ 
shorter time slots in DSE focused investment sections. In contrast, as mining clubs are limited 
to one speaker over lunch, organisers may have incentives to attract better known firms or 
firms with novel or controversial development concepts. Interestingly, there is no significant 
difference in the number of price-sensitive disclosures or precious metal focus by club and 
conference firms. 
 
4.2 Market reaction 
Fig. 1 graphically illustrates an upward, positive CAR around the 15 days before and 
after the presentation. There is also a distinct rise on the presentation day (t = 0). In addition, 
the steeper slopes pre-rather than post-presentation, suggest a positive market build up due to 
anticipation of good news in the presentation.5 Fig. 2 shows a spike in abnormal daily 
turnover centred on event day 0. 
                                                          
5 The identity of presenting firms is likely known before the presentation date however we are unable to identify 
when the market becomes aware of this information. We acknowledge that any potential signalling or selection 
effect may be impounded at this unobservable date rather than the presentation date. Therefore, the market 
reaction to the presentation is most likely a reaction to information content than selection or signalling effects, 
biasing against the likelihood of finding a significant market reaction. This approach is consistent with prior 
presentation research (Francis et al., 1997; Bushee et al., 2009). We also recognize the distance between when 
the market is aware of the upcoming presentation likely varies across presentation outlets as does the magnitude 
of the selection or signalling effect. 
Daily abnormal returns and turnover over event days -15 to 15 are reported in Table 5, 
depicting a significant positive return on event day 0 of 0.59%. There are also sporadic 
significant positive abnormal returns in the pre- and post-periods which, along with the lack 
of consistent negative returns, suggest that the positive reaction to the presentation is not 
quickly reversed. Furthermore, there is significant positive daily abnormal turnover on days -
3 to 1. Together these results show that resource firm investor presentations are meaningful 
and informative events. There is another cluster of significant positive abnormal turnovers 
around day 8, although we cannot suggest a cause.  
Table 6 reports t-tests on whether CAR windows are significantly different from 0, 
with the -15 to 15 day window reporting a CAR of 4.8%. Importantly, all CAR windows over 
the presentation are significantly positively different from 0, indicating a positive market 
reaction to resource firm investor presentations. The significant abnormal return on event day 
0 provides confidence that the longer CAR window results are not driven by correlation of 
returns, which would likely be worse over longer windows. The pre-presentation windows 
are consistently significant and larger than the post-presentation CAR windows, mirroring the 
graphical representation. Again, this result suggests that the market reacts positively in the 
lead up to the presentation. The security return results of Tables 5 and 6 both suggest that the 
positive reaction to presentations is not quickly reversed due to either presentations being 
uninformative events or mean reversion. This result contrasts with previous research (Francis 
et al., 1997), likely due to the comparatively higher information asymmetry and the lower 
information intermediation present in the resource sector relative to settings in prior 
literature. We also examine whether there is any long term market benefit over days -15 to 
200. However, due to data restrictions this is run on a restricted sample of 733 presentations. 
Although there is a slightly positive CAR, it is not significantly different from 0. This result 
suggests that presentations do not have long term price benefits due to greater firm awareness 
or that presentation outlets cannot pick future winners. Overall, this evidence suggests that 
resource firm investor presentations are informative events in an equity markets context.  
 
4.3 Market reaction determinants 
Table 7 reports results of OLS regressions of CAR on presentation and firm 
attributes.6 The results show there is a stronger reaction for first time presenting firms over 
the 31 and 216 day windows. This suggests the greater value of disseminating firm news 
                                                          
6 Variance Inflation Factor’s are all lower than 2.5, suggesting no problematic multicollinearity (Lardaro, 1993). 
when the firm is a relative unknown. Presentations at the Excellence in Oil & Gas and Africa 
Downunder conferences also had stronger reactions over the -15 to 15 day window. 
However, these results do not extend to the 1 or 216 day windows, indicating that no 
presentation outlet provides a markedly superior disclosure platform or credibility. As the 
result is found only in the 31 day window, it could suggest that ADU and EOG firms either 
release good news before the presentation or the market anticipates more of the gains. 
Alternatively, the positive coefficient is consistent with EOG or ADU having a selection 
effect or that they are intrinsically better at selecting winners over a 31 day window. We 
interpret the significant negative coefficient on DND on the presentation date as a function of 
the pre-release of detailed Diggers and Dealers programmes removing any signalling effect. 
Presentations that are announced to the market also have a stronger 1 day reaction consistent 
with greater investor access to firm news and price-sensitive information being announced 
per ASX guidance.  
There is some evidence (p<0.1) that precious metal focused firms have stronger 
market reactions, potentially indicative of active ‘gold bugs’ however this result does not 
extend to the longer windows. There is no evidence that Australian focused firms have 
different market reactions. Unsurprisingly, a greater amount of firm specific news over the 31 
day window is also associated with a higher market return over the same length window. 
Firms with greater ownership concentration have more negative reactions, consistent with 
large shareholders typically being value investors rather than active traders. This result also 
suggests that presentations are an effective communication method for firms with a disperse 
ownership base. We note the flipping sign for the commodity price index (MOM) depicts the 
importance of commodity prices in predicting future returns of resource stocks, relative to a 
short term window where firm specific information appears to be more important. 
 
4.4 Robustness and sensitivity testing 
In unreported results, we test the robustness of the main findings by using alternate 
benchmarks. We use the ASX 300 Materials and ASX 300 Metals and Mining Indexes to 
calculate abnormal returns. Application of alternative benchmarks produce similar results. To 
test the sensitivity of the market reaction determinants, the regression is re-run with alternate 
variable measurement. First, based on judgement from reading firm descriptions in the annual 
report, we create binary variables equal to one if the firm is focused on precious metals or 
Australian operations. This allows us to re-run the determinants regression using the full 
samples of 817, 817 and 733 for the 31, 0 and 216 day windows, respectively. This 
specification produces very similar results to those reported, providing confidence that the 
exclusions did not bias results. Second, resource momentum is recalculated as the six month 
change in the resource commodity price and the commodity price level at the time of the 
presentation. This produces similar results apart from ADU no longer being significantly 
associated to the 31 day CAR window. Third, to control for any time effect we add a binary 
variable equal to one if the presentation was held after 2006, which produces similar results.7 
Fourth, we run the determinants regression for the 31 and 1 day windows using only 
observations which also have data for the 216 day window. This specification produces 
similar results, providing confidence that there is no data restriction effect. Fifth, the outlying 
1% and 5% of CAR observations are removed to test for any outlier effect. The results are 
consistent apart from ADU and PREC are not significantly associated to the 31 and 1 day 
CAR windows, respectively. However, this difference is consistent with the highest positive 
reactions being to Africa Downunder and precious metal focused firms which would be 
removed from this analysis.  
A potential methodological issue with conducting event studies in the small-cap 
resource sector is non-synchronous or thin trading biasing results (Brown and Warner, 1985; 
Kallunki, 1997; Leemakdej, 2009). To provide confidence that non-synchronous trading does 
drive or bias the main results we pro-rate allocate daily returns to any immediately preceding 
non-trading days, which produces consistent, although slightly weaker results (Kallunki, 
1997).8 Second, we remove the 362 observations where the stock does not trade in any of the 
15 days before or after the investor presentation.9 The resulting sub-sample produces similar, 
but stronger results. Fourth, as non-parametric rank tests can provide superior insight in 
samples prone to non-synchronous trading (Leemakdej, 2009), we compare whether there is a 
difference between the abnormal return on event day 0 relative to the 15 days before and after 
using the non-parametric Mann-Whitney U test and find significantly higher returns on event 
day 0 (z-score = 2.575). This result also holds in the sub-sample of firms that trade 
                                                          
7 We split on 2006 due to the increasing number of resource firm investor presentations after 2007, coupled with 
a resource ‘boom’. Alternate year controls produce similar results. 
8 Kallunki (1997) also proposes using the closing bid price however given the high information asymmetry 
present in the sample this would likely introduce more noise and thus we do not use this method. 
9 These non-trading days could be caused by non-synchronous trading, trading halts or database errors. In 
particular, there is a database error in the 7 event days around the 25th of August 2009 which effects 42 
observations. Main results and robustness tests are robust to both the inclusion and exclusion of these 42 
observations. 
continuously. Overall, we conclude that non-synchronous trading does not appear to be 
biasing the results and that the main findings of this paper are robust. 
 
5 Conclusions 
This paper adds to the literature by documenting that resource firm investor 
presentations are informative events and aid in capital allocation. The positive returns leading 
up to the presentation date suggests they follow good news stories or are partly anticipated by 
the market. Furthermore, the positive returns do not reverse over the following 15 days in 
contrast with previous literature, although there is no significant long term positive return. 
We provide further insight by investigating the effect of presentation and firm attributes on 
the market reaction. These results suggest a superior CAR by first time presenting firms, 
presentations announced to the market and presentations at Africa Downunder and 
Excellence in Oil & Gas conferences. There are also stronger returns to firms with lower 
ownership concentration. 
These results add to the disclosure and dissemination literature by examining boutique 
industry presentations in the unique setting of the Australian resource sector with its 
relatively high information asymmetry and important non-financial disclosures. Furthermore, 
the results are of practical interest to both resource firms and investors in the mining industry. 
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Table 1 
Descriptive statistics for ASX firms by Industry in 2009 
    10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 
Variables 
 
Energy Mat. Indust. 
Cons. 
Disc. 
Con. 
Staple 
Health-
care Fin. I.T. Telecom. Util. 
Total Assets Mean    453.1     617.4     807.5     870.1    2,463.3     228.2    11,236.9       77.7    2,994.8    2,256.4  
Median      20.4       11.7     101.3       60.0         98.7       13.2         158.0       22.5         26.2       357.9  
Total Liabilities Mean    182.6     295.1     494.1     448.1    1,350.0       98.3    10,139.2       42.5    1,627.5    1,590.5  
Median        1.8         0.7       49.4       27.5         48.7         2.6           45.2         5.8           8.3       220.1  
Current Ratio Mean 11.07 56.70 2.23 3.03 2.49 6.90 15.07 4.10 1.62 4.82 
Median 4.95 5.13 1.38 1.41 1.38 2.57 1.61 1.30 0.84 1.81 
Debt-to-Equity Mean 29% 32% 38% 34% 35% 30% 47% 35% 35% 41% 
Median 8% 6% 33% 31% 33% 17% 22% 20% 24% 38% 
ROA Mean -69% -60% -17% -11% -17% -59% -16% -128% -28% -13% 
Median -15% -16% 5% 5% 1% -24% 2% 4% 7% 1% 
Total Revenue Mean 292.9  363.3  629.5  626.8  3,447.7  180.7  88.4  75.9  1,771.2  474.4  
Median 0.5  0.1  116.4  69.6  92.1  2.5  0.0  15.8  38.1  28.5  
Operating Exp. Mean -246.8  -280.9  -551.5  -528.9  -3,181.7  -154.9  -77.0  -63.7  -1,077.3  -384.8  
Median -6.0  -3.0  -95.0  -61.2  -85.1  -8.7  0.0  -14.4  -23.3  -12.2  
Net CFO Mean 37.6  68.8  53.5  55.6  198.4  18.2  171.9  9.4  556.7  81.2  
Median -0.8  -0.7  7.6  2.1  0.5  -1.0  3.4  1.0  1.5  6.5  
Constituents Count       209        625        185        154            43        148            280          98            27            32  
% 12% 35% 10% 9% 2% 8% 16% 5% 1% 2% 
                        
Table 1 presents means and medians for selected financial characteristics by industry category, as defined by two-digit GICS codes as at the end of 2009. Industry categories are Energy, Materials, Industrials, 
Consumer Discretionary, Consumer Staples, Healthcare, Financials, Information Technology, Telecommunications and Utilities, respectively. Total Assets, Total Liabilities, Total Revenue, Operating Exp. and Net 
CFO are in millions of Australian dollars and are the figures reported in the Aspect Huntley database for 2009.  I also report the industry breakdown by percentage of ASX constituents as at the end of 2009.  
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Table 2 
Summary statistics for resource firm investor presentations 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 Total 
Presentation outlets 
         DND 25 26 29 30 32 34 33 35 32 30 306 
AMEC 0 0 0 0 0 19 14 24 25 18 100 
EME 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 45 34 79 
EOG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 27 23 50 
ADU 0 0 0 7 14 17 17 21 28 42 146 
SMC 0 3 12 9 6 14 11 10 13 16 94 
MMC 0 2 3 2 6 3 2 6 4 2 30 
BMC 0 0 0 0 0 4 3 2 2 1 12 
Club 0 5 15 11 12 21 16 18 19 19 136 
Total  25 31 44 48 58 91 80 98 176 166 817 
          
Presentation characteristics          
INT 25 15 18 18 24 33 18 39 82 54 326 
ANN 3 4 11 16 22 50 40 64 118 113 441 
                        
Table 2 presents counts for presentation characteristics. DND is the Diggers and Dealers conference, AMEC is the Association of Mining & Exploration Companies conference, EME and EOG are the Excellence in 
Mining & Exploration and Oil & Gas conferences, respectively and ADU is the Africa Downunder conference. SMC, MMC and BMC stand for the Sydney, Melbourne and Brisbane mining club presentations, 
respectively, and Club is presentations at any of the three mining clubs (SMC, MMC or BMC). INT is a binary variable equal to 1 for the first firm presentation. ANN is a binary variable equal to 1 if the presentation is 
announced to the market. 
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Table 3 
Descriptive statistics for presenting firms 
Continuous variables Mean Median Min. Max Std. dev. N 
Current Assets 366,241 20,784 113 27,712,596 2,008,217 817 
Total Assets 1,567,250 62,209 696 129,353,349 8,774,599 817 
Total Liabilities 844,852 12,747 14 96,932,737 5,517,314 817 
Net CFO 205,181 -833 -2,141,185 23,247,474 1,544,164 817 
MCAP 1,502,685 117,691 529 144,714,234 8,027,384 817 
SIZE 16.394 16.281 10.877 23.395 2.029 817 
TOP20 62.19 61.96 14.51 99.48 17.27 817 
MOM 1.49 31.39 -286.29 214.56 114.07 817 
PSDISC 4.83 4.00 0.00 30.00 4.24 817 
     
 
 
    
Restricted sample           
PREC 0.420 0.323 0.000 1.000 0.341 766     
AUS 0.431 0.378 0.000 1.000 0.265 766       
     
 
 Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for presenting firms. Current Assets, Total Assets, Total Liabilities and Net CFO are in thousands of Australian dollars and are the figures reported in the annual report of firm i in 
year t.  MCAP is the market capitalization in thousands of Australian dollars of firm i at the end of year t, as measured by shares outstanding times closing share price. SIZE is the natural logarithm of MCAP. TOP20 is 
the percentage of shares owned by the largest 20 shareholders, as reported in the annual report of firm i in year t. MOM is the difference in S&P GSCI spot price from the start of the presenting month to one year 
previously. PSDISC is the number of price-sensitive announcements issued by firm i over the 15 days before and after event date t. PREC is the count of the words ‘gold’, ‘silver’, ‘palladium’, ‘platinum’ and ‘precious’ 
over mentions of all minerals in the annual report of firm i in year t. AUS is the count of the word ‘Australia’ over mentions of all countries in the annual report of firm i in year t. 
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Table 4 
Univariate analysis on presenting firm characteristics 
Variable Club Conference t-stat  n 
Current Assets             1,192,544               201,223  2.879 ** 817 
Total Assets             5,234,945               834,789  2.828 ** 817 
Total Liabilities             3,069,745               400,527  2.547 * 817 
Net CFO                759,808                 94,419  2.655 ** 817 
MCAP             4,478,701               908,356  3.294 *** 817 
SIZE 17.712 16.130 7.490 *** 817 
TOP20 67.398 61.147 3.856 *** 817 
PSDISC 5.103 4.781 0.698  817 
 
     
Restricted sample      
PREC 0.387 0.423 -1.072  766 
AUS 0.377 0.445 -2.867 ** 766 
           
Table 4 presents univariate analysis of presenting firm characteristics split by whether the presentation was at a mining club or conference. Club is equal to 1 if the presentation was at SMC, MMC or BMC and 
Conference is equal to 1 if the presentation was at DND, AMEC, EME, EOG or ADU. Current Assets, Total Assets, Total Liabilities and Net CFO are in thousands of Australian dollars and are the figures reported in 
the annual report of firm i in year t.  MCAP is the market capitalization in thousands of Australian dollars of firm i at the end of year t, as measured by shares outstanding times closing share price. SIZE is the natural 
logarithm of MCAP. TOP20 is the percentage of shares owned by the largest 20 shareholders, as reported in the annual report of firm i in year t. PSDISC is the number of price-sensitive announcements issued by firm i 
over the 15 days before and after event date t. PREC is the count of the words ‘gold’, ‘silver’, ‘palladium’, ‘platinum’ and ‘precious’ over mentions of all minerals in the annual report of firm i in year t. AUS is the 
count of the word ‘Australia’ over mentions of all countries in the annual report of firm i in year t. Two-tailed test of significance: *** = less than .001, ** = less than .01, * = less than .05 and + = less than .10.  
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Figure 1 
Cumulative abnormal returns over event days -15 to 15 
 
 
 
Figure 2 
Daily abnormal turnover over event days -15 to 15 
 
 
 
  
-0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
0.06
-15 -13 -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
ab
no
rm
al
 re
tu
rn
 
Event day 
-0.0004
-0.0002
0.0000
0.0002
0.0004
0.0006
0.0008
0.0010
-15 -13 -11 -9 -7 -5 -3 -1 1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15
Ab
no
rm
al
 tu
rn
ov
er
 
Event day 
22 
 
Table 5 
Significance tests on abnormal returns and turnover 
  Abnormal return   Abnormal turnover   
Event day AR t-stat     ATURN t-stat   n 
-15 -0.0020 -1.475  
 
-0.0002 -1.710 + 817 
-14 0.0013 0.846  
 
0.0001 0.504  817 
-13 -0.0017 -1.130  
 
0.0000 -0.135  817 
-12 0.0042 3.002 ** 
 
-0.0001 -0.820  817 
-11 0.0004 0.231  
 
0.0000 0.141  817 
-10 0.0036 2.178 * 
 
0.0001 0.438  817 
-9 0.0024 1.586  
 
0.0001 0.503  817 
-8 0.0037 2.638 ** 
 
0.0000 -0.226  817 
-7 0.0001 0.088  
 
0.0000 -0.119  817 
-6 0.0021 1.389  
 
0.0000 -0.114  817 
-5 0.0000 0.022  
 
0.0002 1.179  817 
-4 0.0015 1.081  
 
0.0001 0.444  817 
-3 0.0036 2.419 * 
 
0.0003 1.601  817 
-2 0.0025 1.323  
 
0.0004 1.760 + 817 
-1 0.0025 1.440  
 
0.0006 2.722 ** 817 
0 0.0059 3.393 *** 
 
0.0008 4.430 *** 817 
1 -0.0001 -0.090  
 
0.0004 2.619 ** 817 
2 0.0005 0.306  
 
0.0003 2.248 * 817 
3 0.0034 2.053 * 
 
0.0002 1.499  817 
4 0.0054 3.478 *** 
 
0.0004 2.155 * 817 
5 0.0018 1.043  
 
0.0001 0.716  817 
6 0.0017 1.057  
 
0.0004 2.776 ** 817 
7 0.0011 0.552  
 
0.0004 2.310 * 817 
8 0.0005 0.296  
 
0.0003 1.809 + 817 
9 -0.0012 -0.828  
 
0.0004 2.239 * 817 
10 0.0028 1.713 + 
 
0.0003 1.783 + 817 
11 0.0001 0.066  
 
0.0005 3.139 ** 817 
12 -0.0026 -1.698  
 
0.0002 1.341  817 
13 0.0034 1.978 * 
 
0.0002 1.081  817 
14 0.0006 0.342  
 
-0.0001 -0.596  817 
15 0.0007 0.488  
 
-0.0001 -0.350  817 
                  
Table 5 presents Student t-tests on daily AR and ATURN to test for difference from 0. AR is calculated per equation 1 and ATURN per 
equation 3. Two-tailed test of significance: *** = less than .001, ** = less than .01, * = less than .05 and + = less than .10.  
 
 
  
23 
 
Table 6 
Significance tests on CAR 
CAR window CAR t-stat   n 
Full sample 
    -15 to 15 0.048 5.888 *** 817 
-10 to 10 0.044 6.262 *** 817 
-5 to 5 0.027 5.640 *** 817 
-3 to 3 0.018 4.819 *** 817 
-1 to 1 0.008 3.145 ** 817 
-15 to -3 0.019 4.103 *** 817 
-15 to -11 0.019 4.103 *** 817 
-10 to -6 0.012 3.685 *** 817 
-5 to -1 0.010 2.919 ** 817 
3 to 15 0.018 3.226 *** 817 
1 to 5 0.011 3.133 ** 817 
6 to 10 0.005 1.260  817 
11 to 15 0.002 0.675  817 
        
 Restricted sample 
   
  
-15 to 200 0.003 0.066 733 
          
Table 6 presents Student t-tests on CAR to test for difference from 0. CAR is calculated as per equations 1 and 2. Two-tailed test of 
significance: *** = less than .001, ** = less than .01, * = less than .05 and + = less than .10. 
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Table 7 
The market reaction determinants of resource firm investor presentations 
  -15 to 15   0   -15 to 200 
Variable coeff. t-stat     coeff. t-stat     coeff. t-stat   
Intercept 0.0079 0.113 
  
0.0128 0.641 
  
-1.5105 -5.301 *** 
DND -0.0110 -0.614 
  
-0.0107 -2.455 * 
 
-0.0652 -0.962 
 AMEC 0.0350 1.357 
  
0.0028 0.418 
  
-0.1294 -1.332 
 EME 0.0339 1.165 
  
-0.0056 -0.702 
  
-0.0370 -0.370 
 EOG 0.1275 2.391 * 
 
-0.0039 -0.349 
  
0.2128 1.381 
 ADU 0.0473 1.848 + 
 
-0.0004 -0.063 
  
0.1068 1.040 
 INT 0.0484 3.037 ** 
 
-0.0008 -0.215 
  
0.1457 2.666 ** 
ANN -0.0158 -1.034 
  
0.0083 2.418 * 
 
-0.0821 -1.579 
 PREC -0.0120 -0.563 
  
0.0092 1.953 + 
 
0.1396 1.550 
 AUS -0.0060 -0.214 
  
0.0028 0.393 
  
0.1430 1.292 
 PSDISC 0.0045 2.306 * 
 
-0.0002 -0.653 
  
0.0035 0.429 
 SIZE -0.0019 -0.466 
  
0.0007 0.614 
  
0.0927 6.005 *** 
MOM -0.0002 -2.861 ** 
 
0.0000 -0.937 
  
0.0019 6.555 *** 
TOP20 0.0004 1.108 
  
-0.0004 -2.675 ** 
 
-0.0038 -2.045 * 
      
 
  
  
 Adj. R2  4.70%  2.08%  9.16% 
n  766 
   
766 
   
698  
                       
Table 7 presents regression results of the determinants of CAR calculated as per equations 1 and 2 over the indicated window centred on the firm presentation. DND is a binary variable equal to 1 for a Diggers and 
Dealers conference presentation; AMEC is a binary variable equal to 1 for a Association of Mining & Exploration Companies conference presentation; EME is a binary variable equal to 1 for an Excellence in Mining & 
Exploration conference presentation; EOG is a binary variable equal to 1 for a Excellence in Oil & Gas conference presentation; ADU is a binary variable equal to 1 for an Africa Downunder conference presentation; 
INT is a binary variable equal to 1 for the first presentation of firm i; ANN is a binary variable equal to 1 if the presentation by firm i at time t  is announced to the market; PREC is the count of the words ‘gold’, ‘silver’, 
‘palladium’, ‘platinum’ and ‘precious’ over mentions of all minerals in the annual report of firm i in year t; AUS is the count of the word ‘Australia’ over mentions of all countries in the annual report of firm i in year t; 
PSDISC is the number of price-sensitive announcements issued by firm i over the 15 days before and after event date t; SIZE is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of firm i as at the end of year t; MOM is 
the difference in S&P GSCI spot price from the start of the presenting month to one year previously; TOP20 is the percentage of shares owned by the largest 20 shareholders, as reported in the annual report of firm i in 
year t. Two-tailed test of significance: *** = less than .001, ** = less than .01, * = less than .05 and + = less than .10. 
